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735 
THE MONSTER IN THE CLOSET: DECLAWING 
THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT BEAST IN THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ARENA 
INTRODUCTION 
The monster rearing its ugly head in the nightmares of patent 
practitioners1 goes by the name of “inequitable conduct”—and it has 
been sinking its claws into practitioners all too frequently in recent 
decades.2 Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee, his attorney, or 
anyone associated with the prosecution of the patent, breaches his 
duty of candor and good faith by affirmatively misrepresenting or 
failing to disclose material information to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO).3 “A charge of inequitable conduct 
typically arises as a defense to patent infringement. A defendant will 
allege that a plaintiff’s patent is unenforceable because of 
improprieties carried out during the patent’s prosecution.”4  
A finding of inequitable conduct has potentially devastating and 
far-reaching consequences for the patentee and the prosecuting patent 
                                                                                                                 
 1. “Patent practitioners” include patent attorneys and patent agents (technically qualified non-
lawyers) who draft and prosecute patent applications before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO), 
have passed the patent bar examination, and have obtained licenses from the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. 
§§ 11.6, 11.7, 11.9, 11.10 (2007). This term has generated some controversy, and some question whether 
the attorney-client privilege should extend to patent agents. See generally Arnold D. Litt et al., 
Comment, The Patent Practitioner Attains Majority: An Examination of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
and Work Product Rule As They Pertain to the Patent Attorney and Agent, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 531 
(1972–1973). That inquiry is outside of the scope of this Note. 
 2. See, e.g., Thomas L. Irving et al., The Inequitable Conduct “Plague” in U.S. Patent Litigation, 
IP LAW & TECH. PROGRAMME (2006) available at http://www.finnegan.com/files/PDFs/ 
200902041002333521848news1385.pdf (noting that “[f]or almost the last [twenty] years, ‘the habit of 
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has [been] an absolute plague’”) 
(internal citations omitted); Andrea Kamage and Deborah Sterling, The Patent Plague: Inequitable 
Conduct Findings Are on the Rise, with No End in Sight, IP L. & BUS. Aug. 2005 at 28 (noting that 
“[t]here’s no end in sight for the profusion of inequitable conduct charges” and even though “the 
inequitable conduct plague might be less creepy than a pack of locusts, it’s no less bothersome to those 
affected.”). 
 3. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007); see also GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“prov[ing] inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent requires evidence of affirmative 
misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false 
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive”) (citation omitted). 
 4. Kamage, supra note 2; see also Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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attorney.5 Because an inequitable conduct charge involves the patent 
attorney's intent, the patentee may wish to call the attorney who 
prosecuted the patent to testify at trial.6 Unfortunately, when the 
patent attorney testifies about his intent (or lack thereof) to deceive 
the PTO during the prosecution of the patent at issue, that testimony 
may waive attorney-client privilege.7  
Attorney-client privilege waiver in the context of inequitable 
conduct remains chaotic. Many district courts fumble with which law 
to apply;8 even when the courts choose the right law for attorney-
client privilege in inequitable conduct cases, they inconsistently 
construe the scope of the waiver, compromising fairness and 
predictability.9 That uncertainty defeats the privilege’s purpose; as 
Justice Rehnquist stated, “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which 
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by 
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”10 
Further complicating matters, patent law has entered a major state 
of flux. The United States House of Representatives ratified a major 
patent reform bill in 2007,11 two patent reform bills were under 
consideration in the United States Senate in 2008,12 the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 6. See, e.g., GFI, 265 F.3d at 1273; Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 
781252, *2, 6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2007); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1673, 1679–80 (D. Del. 1990).  
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (striking down a district court’s test—
basing availability of attorney-client privilege upon whether a corporation’s officer played a 
“‘substantial role’ in deciding and directing the corporation’s legal response”—because it was difficult 
to apply and caused “disparate decisions,” revealing its unpredictability). 
 11. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Christopher Faille, Patent Reform 
Clears Hurdle, HEDGE WORLD DAILY NEWS, 2007 WLNR 17684327 (Sept. 10, 2007). “The U.S. House 
of Representatives on Friday [Sept. 7] approved a sweeping patent law reform bill, in response to the 
concerns raised by industry groups that intellectual property claims and resulting litigation have become 
a bottleneck for innovation and growth. The vote was 220–175.” Id.  
 12. GovTrack.us, S. 1145; Patent Reform Act of 2007, available at http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (noting that S. 1145 was introduced in 2007 by Senator Patrick Leahy 
(D-Vt) and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar in January of 2008 for consideration by the 
Senate); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposed by Senate Minority Whip 
Jon Kyl (R-Az) in September of 2008, and specifically offering ideas for reform in the arena of 
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Court has granted certiorari and reversed an unusually high number 
of patent cases appealed from the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit,13 and the PTO is proposing to revamp its rules to 
significantly shift the burden from its examiners back onto patentees 
and their attorneys.14 The first set of new PTO rules, promulgated in 
August of 2007 and originally slated to become effective November 
1, 2007, met with a last-minute preliminary injunction and were 
found to exceed the scope of the PTO’s rulemaking authority.15 
Another new set of PTO rules, directly related to the duty of 
disclosure,16 were proposed by the PTO in 2006 and will become 
effective if approved.17 Now, with patent law in flux, and the new 
duty of disclosure rules hovering on the horizon, the perfect storm 
exists for litigation in inequitable conduct cases to run amuck.  
This Note will address three main topics. Part I will provide a 
general primer on the patent law rules for inequitable conduct cases, 
including when attorney-client privilege is implicated, when it is 
waived, and how courts determine the relevant choice of law in those 
cases.18 Part II will analyze the inconsistency in the federal courts’ 
                                                                                                                 
inequitable conduct) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
110_cong_bills&docid=f:s3600is.txt.pdf.  
 13. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), rev’g 453 F.3d 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), rev’g 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), rev’g 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), rev’g 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 14. See Robert Hulse, New Rules for U.S. Patent Applications, MONDAQ, 2007 WLNR 16534630 
(Aug. 24, 2007). 
 15. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656–57 (E.D. Va. 2007) (issuing a preliminary injunction, 
halting the implementation of the PTO’s promulgated rules); Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 806 
(E.D. Va. 2008) (finding the “rules promulgated by PTO were substantive rules, and thus exceeded 
scope of the PTO’s rulemaking authority”). 
 16. Dorothy R. Auth, Patent Application Disclosure Requirements and Inequitable Conduct for 
Failure to Disclose, 26 IPL NEWSLETTER 1, 1 (No. 3, Spring 2008); John Gladstone Mills et al., 
Information Disclosure (Prior Art) Statements and Proposed Rules Modifying Information Disclosure 
Statement (IDS) Practice Before the USPTO, PAT. L. BASICS § 13:19, pt. IV (Oct. 2007); see also 71 
Fed. Reg. 38808 (July 10, 2006). 
 17. Some consider those rules drastic enough to warrant fleeing patent work altogether. See, e.g., 
Steven M. Nipper, New USPTO IDS Regulations a Litigator’s Dream???????, http://inventblog.com/ 
2007/08/new-uspto-ids-regulations-a-litigators-dream.html (Aug. 9, 2007)  (lamenting that because 
“[t]he patent system is under massive attack from all three branches of government: judicial (KSR), 
legislative (the bogus ‘patent reform’ bill) and executive (this IDS rule and the continuation rule, out of 
the PTO)[,] [i]t’s time to start getting out of the patent prosecution business”) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
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application of whether attorney-client privilege is implicated when an 
attorney testifies against a charge of inequitable conduct, highlighting 
how courts across the United States apply the scope of that waiver 
unevenly; Part II will also address whether classifying an attorney as 
a fact witness under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—governing testimony of designated corporate 
representatives—allows testimony in defense of inequitable conduct 
charges without implicating attorney-client privilege.19 Part III will 
propose possible solutions for the inequities caused by the 
inconsistent application of the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
waiver, from legislative solutions modifying the new information 
disclosure statement rules, to judicial solutions creating more 
consistent, predictable interpretations of the attorney-client privilege 
waiver, to litigation strategies aimed at helping attorneys and clients 
cope with the uncertainties in the meantime.20 
I.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Inequitable Conduct21 
“A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct 
if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the [patent] 
examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits materially 
false information to the PTO during prosecution.”22 This duty extends 
to “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application,” including the attorneys writing and prosecuting 
the patent before the PTO.23 All individuals associated with the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III. 
 21. Inequitable conduct is considered a type of “fraud upon the PTO,” a somewhat antiquated term 
in this context. See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 22. Id. at 1345 (citations omitted). 
 23. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), (c) (2007). Inequitable conduct does not apply to attorneys litigating the 
patent in court, but only to attorneys or agents writing the patent applications and communicating with 
the PTO (referred to as “patent prosecution” rather than “patent litigation”). Generally, the attorney 
prosecuting the patent differs from the attorney litigating the patent in court.  
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patent’s filing must disclose, inter alia, all known prior art24 and 
other information likely to affect the PTO’s decision to grant the 
patent.25  
Currently, one primary method for disclosing information to the 
PTO includes filing a document called an Information Disclosure 
Statement (IDS).26 Under the current rules, practitioners prepare an 
IDS by, inter alia, listing out all patents or other documents that they 
know may be material to the pending prosecution and, subject to 
limitations required by law, send it to the PTO—along with copies of 
the documents—to satisfy the duty of disclosure.27 A failure to satisfy 
this duty adequately constitutes inequitable conduct.28 An IDS may 
list hundreds of references, many of which could be in foreign 
languages that may or may not be fully translated.29 Under the new 
disclosure rules proposed by the PTO, the list in the IDS would be 
limited to twenty items; any items submitted in excess of twenty 
would require an accompanying explanation of the relevance of the 
item to the new invention.30 This new twist could make it even more 
important to iron out the kinks in the attorney-client privilege waiver 
issue for inequitable conduct cases.31 
A successful claim of inequitable conduct also requires proof of 
intent to deceive.32 Intent cannot be presumed, and cannot be 
established where “the applicant did not know of the undisclosed 
                                                                                                                 
 24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “prior art” as information “publicly 
known, used by others, or available on the date of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art, 
including what would be obvious from that knowledge”). “The U.S. [PTO] and courts analyze prior art 
before deciding the patentability of a comparable invention.” Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 Supp. 
II 2002). 
 25. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007) (governing the duty of disclosure). 
 26. Id. §§ 1.56, 1.97, and 1.98 (2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 1.56. 
 29. See generally Dennis Crouch, Prepare for the New IDS Rules (Oct. 20, 2007), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/10/prepare-for-the.html (“In some cases, extensive pre-filing 
prior art searches reveal dozens (if not hundreds) of prior art references that are all then submitted to the 
PTO for review.”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
 30. Auth, supra note 16; Stephen Schreiner, Patent Office Treatment of Financial Matters, 123 
B.L.J. 660 (2006). 
 31. See Nipper, supra note 17. 
 32. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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information . . . , did not know of the materiality of the omission or 
misstatement, or the applicant’s omission or error ‘did not result from 
an intent to mislead the PTO.’”33 More recently, the intent to deceive 
inquiry has seemingly relaxed, and some courts now find inequitable 
conduct in cases where the attorney simply lacked a good-faith 
reason for failure to disclose, effectively shifting the burden of proof 
to practitioners.34 
A finding of inequitable conduct has potentially devastating and 
far reaching consequences for a patentee, including (1) rendering the 
entire patent unenforceable,35 (2) forcing the patentee to pay the 
opponent’s attorney’s fees in an infringement suit,36 and (3) leading 
to liability under the antitrust laws, Federal Trade Commission Act, 
or securities laws.37 It may also stigmatize the attorney—regardless 
of whether the claim of inequitable conduct succeeds—and may 
“lead to disciplinary proceedings against the attorney at the PTO and 
before his or her state bar.”38  
In one case, a district court found the defendant’s former attorney 
had committed inequitable conduct as part of its analysis invalidating 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent Cases, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 719, 722 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1345 
(stating that courts, inferring intent to deceive from circumstances and facts surrounding an applicant’s 
overall conduct, do not require “smoking gun evidence”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 34. Compare Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Kamage, 
supra note 2 with M. Eagles Tools Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) and Irving, supra note 2, at 1 (noting a series of Federal Circuit cases from February 
and March of 2006 that “appear to offer a path towards ‘healthy’ living; a path leading away from an 
absolute liability standard . . . and at long last toward reasonability, more properly taking into account 
the complexities of patent preparation and prosecution”). See also Cameron K. Weiffenbach, 
Implications of Praxair v. ATMI, IP.Law360.com, http://ip.law360.com/print_article/79672 (Jan. 14, 
2009) (highlighting the inconsistent and fluctuating application of inequitable conduct standards by the 
Federal Circuit in the latter part of 2008). 
 35. Unenforceability is a defense to liability for patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000 & Supp. 
II 2002); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1338; Mech. Plastic Corp. v. Rawlplug Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1058, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]o set up a disincentive for shirking this duty to disclose, courts 
have permitted defendants to assert, as a defense to a claim of patent infringement, that the patent in suit 
is unenforceable by reason of the applicant’s ‘inequitable conduct’ in dealings with the PTO.’’).  
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (allowing for an award of attorney’s fees in exceptional cases).  
 37. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (2007); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 
1346.  
 38. Jerry Cohen, Ethical Issues in Intellectual Property, in INTELL. PROP. PRAC. § 12-3 (2004). 
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the defendant’s patent.39 Although the court mentioned the attorney 
by name—potentially impacting his reputation and his liability—the 
Federal Circuit found the denial of the attorney’s motion to intervene 
proper because he “lack[ed] a substantial legal interest in the 
underlying litigation.”40 The Federal Circuit, though affirming the 
refusal to allow the attorney to intervene, addressed the merits of the 
case, saying that “there appears to be some force to [the attorney’s] 
argument on the merits.”41 It is upon this backdrop of inequitable 
conduct, with high stakes for patentees and attorneys, where the 
attorney-client privilege waiver analysis begins. 
B.   A General Overview of Attorney-Client Privilege and Its Waiver 
in the Patent Context 
When a prosecuting patent attorney testifies in defense of a charge 
of inequitable conduct, the court must determine (1) the appropriate 
choice of law for analyzing attorney-client privilege; (2) whether 
attorney-client privilege is implicated; (3) if attorney-client privilege 
is implicated, whether a waiver has occurred; and (4) if a waiver has 
occurred, what is the scope of that waiver.42 Before exploring the 
relevant cases in depth,43 some background on the applicable choice 
of law and the rules of attorney-client privilege is in order. 44 
1.   Choice of Law  
When analyzing attorney-client privilege and its waiver in 
inequitable conduct cases, courts must determine whether to apply 
the law of the regional circuit or the law of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, which governs substantive issues of patent law.45 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Tenn. 2006), aff’d in part by 
497 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 40. Nisus, 497 F.3d at 1322.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See generally In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
 43. See discussion infra Part II. 
 44. See discussion infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 45. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803. 
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The Federal Circuit will apply regional circuit law to procedural 
issues that are not themselves substantive patent law issues so long as 
they do not (1) “intimately involve[] . . . enforcement of [a] patent 
right, . . . (2) bear an essential relationship to matters committed to 
[its] exclusive control by statute, or (3) clearly implicate the 
jurisprudential responsibilities of th[e] court in a field within its 
exclusive jurisdiction.”46  
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the Federal Circuit held 
that determining whether privilege attaches to a communication in a 
case of inequitable conduct is governed by the law of the Federal 
Circuit because it touches on substantive issues of patent law.47 
However, once a court has determined that the attorney-client 
privilege is implicated, the question of whether or not the patentee 
waived that privilege is a matter of regional circuit law because the 
issue of privilege waiver is merely procedural.48 District courts had 
some trouble determining which law to apply after Spalding. Even 
after the Federal Circuit attempted to further clarify the choice of law 
dilemma in Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co. by specifically holding 
that the Federal Circuit “applies the law of the regional circuit . . . 
with respect to questions of attorney-client privilege and waiver of 
attorney-client privilege”; in inequitable conduct cases,49 district 
courts still routinely misapply the law.50 
                                                                                                                 
 46. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also 
Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803. 
 47. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803–04. After a lower court found attorney-client privilege waiver and 
ordered production of an invention record, patentee sought relief with the Federal Circuit. Id. The 
Federal Circuit held the invention record subject to attorney-client privilege, which was neither waived 
nor pierced by the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege waiver. Id. In this case, the court 
articulated the appropriate standard for choice of law. Id. See also Matthew R. Rodgers, Comment, 
Patent Law: Attorney-Client Privilege in Patent Litigation: Did the Federal Circuit Go Far Enough with 
In re Spalding Sports Worldwide?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 731, 740–43 (2002).  
 48. See, e.g., GFI, 265 F.3d at 1272 (holding that regional circuit law governs waiver by disclosure 
of privileged material); In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that regional circuit law governs privilege); In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that regional circuit law governs privilege); Dorf & Stanton Commc’n, Inc. v. 
Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919, 922–23 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that regional circuit law governs 
discovery orders and waiver). 
 49. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1344–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 50. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.  
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2.   Attorney-Client Privilege in the Patent Context 
Attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege under common law 
regarding confidential communications.51 “Deeply rooted in public 
policy, and playing a ‘vital role’ in the administration of justice, it 
remains one of the most carefully guarded privileges and is not 
readily to be whittled down.”52 Litigants may potentially abuse the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege in inequitable conduct cases, using 
it as a ‘tactic’ to garner privileged information from their 
opponents.53 
Inequitable conduct charges appear in almost every case because 
inequitable conduct is the magic bullet, capable of destroying an 
entire patent in one fell swoop.54 Moreover, it creates negative 
equities, permitting the accused infringer to paint the patentee black. 
The natural consequence forces the patentee to decide how to defend 
the case; the patentee can pull his punches and preserve the privilege 
or waive privilege and pray the scope of the waiver is reasonable. 
Thus, the scope of attorney-client privilege waiver, and the scope of 
the compelled disclosure, raise substantial issues of fairness to the 
parties.55  
 a.   Determining When Attorney-Client Privilege Is Implicated 
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the law of privileges 
“shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason 
and experience.”56 Attorney-client privilege generally protects 
communications between attorneys and clients from compelled 
disclosure. It applies to any communication satisfying the following 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 52. Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 
2007) (internal citations omitted).  
 53. See Rodgers, supra note 47, at 749 n.148 and accompanying text. 
 54. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 55. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 56. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also FED. R. EVID. 502 (enacted in late 2008 and limiting waiver of 
attorney-client privilege for inadvertent disclosures and disclosures made in state proceedings, while 
giving teeth to court orders and party agreements governing the scope of the waiver). 
9
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elements: it must be “(1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining 
or providing legal assistance for the client.”57 
 b.   Determining Whether the Attorney-Client Privilege Is 
Waived in Inequitable Conduct Cases 
“The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may 
waive it.”58 When a prosecuting patent attorney testifies in defense of 
an inequitable conduct charge, a waiver may occur if the attorney 
discloses any privileged communications between the attorney and 
client.59 In reality, courts often find waiver whether or not the 
testifying attorney specifically mentions any communications with 
the client; it seems sufficient for the attorney to put his state of mind 
at issue, thereby waiving privilege for any documents tending to 
support or refute his testimony.60 Thus, the waiver is implied by 
conduct.61 Once an attorney begins making statements that could only 
be refuted by documentation subject to attorney-client privilege, 
courts often require disclosure of those documents tending to support 
or refute the attorney’s statements. If, however, the attorney can 
testify as to his state of mind while pointing to non-privileged 
communications to substantiate his testimony, waiver may not 
occur.62 “‘Waiver’ in this broad sense follows from any conduct by 
the client that would make it unfair for him thereafter to assert the 
privilege.”63 
                                                                                                                 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). 
 58. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 59. See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (D. Del. 1990); Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel 
Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2007). 
 60. Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. For a more detailed discussion, see generally 
Rodgers, supra note 47, at 752–59. 
 61. See generally United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1997); GFI, Inc. v. Franklin 
Corp., 265 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 62. See Murata Mfg., 2007 WL 781252 *6. 
 63. DENNIS D. PRATER ET AL., EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD, 1013 (2d ed. 2002) (citing 
United States v. Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that “[t]he concept of waiver by conduct 
exists, but often amounts simply to a determination that the privilege holder’s conduct makes it unfair to 
allow subsequent assertion of the privilege”). 
10
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For example, if an attorney testifies that he had no knowledge of 
prior art, he likely waives his client’s privilege to any documents 
possibly revealing his knowledge of prior art at the time.64 The courts 
generally find waiver in those situations because of fairness,65 and 
because of the desire to strictly construe the attorney-client privilege 
in favor of broad discovery.66 “A mere denial of intent, without more, 
is insufficient to constitute a waiver.”67 What “more” is sufficient to 
waive attorney-client privilege remains less clear.68 At this critical 
juncture patentees encounter a brick wall; this “more” defines the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable conduct 
cases, and district courts inconsistently apply the waiver’s scope, 
even in cases with similar facts.69 Once a court determines that a 
patentee has waived attorney-client privilege, the patentee may 
tremble with fear—and for good reason. 
 c.   Defining the Scope of the Waiver When Attorney-Client 
Privilege Is Waived 
True difficulty arises when determining the scope of the waiver. 
Once the court finds waiver of the attorney-client privilege, that 
waiver extends to “all communications pertaining to the subject 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (holding that because a party claiming privilege 
offered testimony regarding lack of intent, amounting to more than mere denial of intent, he therefore 
waived privilege). But see Murata Mfg., 2007 WL 781252 at *5 (holding that “the mere fact that one’s 
‘state of mind’ becomes an issue in a case does not necessarily mean that the attorney-client privilege 
has been waived” but instead “the manner of proof involved . . . determines whether there has been a 
waiver”). 
 65. See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (supporting 
the proposition that “fairness dictates that a privilege holder ‘cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much 
as he pleases, to withhold the remainder’”) (citation omitted); Ortland, 109 F.3d at 543 (holding that 
when “a party raises a claim which in fairness requires disclosure of the protected communication, the 
privilege may be implicitly waived”) (citation omitted); Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 
(noting that when considering whether a client has waived privilege, the court looks to “considerations 
of fairness and consistency”). 
 66. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 
621 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 67. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also 
Laser Indus. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 68. Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 234 F.R.D. 667, 670–73 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (providing an excellent 
run-down on the law of attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable conduct cases). 
 69. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. (discussing the scope of the waiver). 
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matter of the [already disclosed] communications,” and all courts 
recite this rule.70 However, what exactly constitutes “subject matter” 
can vary broadly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.71 The Federal 
Circuit does not use a bright line test to determine what constitutes 
the subject matter of the waiver of attorney-client privilege; rather, 
the court “weigh[s] the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of 
the legal advice sought, and the prejudice to the parties of permitting 
or prohibiting further disclosures.”72 Uncertainty about the scope of 
the waiver effectively handcuffs patentees with an unpredictable 
waiver issue, which may cause a significant imbalance in trial. 
C.   FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) Fact Witnesses: What’s in a Name? 
Rather than volunteering the prosecuting patent attorney as a 
witness in court when defending a charge of inequitable conduct, a 
patentee may designate the attorney as a Rule 30(b)(6) fact witness 
when opposing counsel seeks information relating to inequitable 
conduct claims.73 This could theoretically occur without waiving 
privilege. Under this rule, titled “Depositions Upon Oral 
Examination,” a party may name an organization74 as a deponent and 
request testimony on a limited subject matter “describe[d] with 
reasonable particularity.”75 The organization so named must then 
appoint someone76 to testify on matters “known or reasonably 
available to the organization.”77 Testimony provided by a fact witness 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) as the patentee’s representative is 
equally binding upon the patentee whether taking place in deposition 
                                                                                                                 
 70. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schofield v. United States 
Steel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-520-PRC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30471 at *8 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
 71. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 72. Fort James Corp v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).  
 74. Here, an organization includes “a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or 
governmental agency.” Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. The organization “shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other 
persons who consent to testify on its behalf.” Id. 
 77. Id. 
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or trial.78 “The testimony of such persons so designated is the 
testimony of the corporation.”79 “If the corporation is a party to the 
litigation, this testimony may be used at trial by an adverse party for 
any purpose.”80 
In this instance, the party alleging inequitable conduct against the 
patentee could notice the deposition of the patentee requesting 
information on a particular topic—such as matters relating to the 
prosecution of the patent at issue—and the patentee would be 
required to designate a representative for deposition capable of 
speaking on the organization’s behalf on this topic.81 The patentee 
could then designate the prosecuting patent attorney to speak on the 
patentee’s behalf at deposition and perhaps eventually at trial.82 A 
mere designation as a 30(b)(6) witness does not waive privilege.83 
Could this designation allow the prosecuting patent attorney to testify 
about the underlying facts of the case without implicating any issues 
covered by the attorney-client privilege? Some cases indicate general 
support for this proposition.84 
Generally speaking, when invoking attorney-client privilege during 
a deposition in a Rule 30(b)(6) context, it is “frequently held to have 
been waived or inapplicable.”85 Once again, fairness remains a key 
consideration: “‘[W]here invasion of the privilege is required to 
determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application 
of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information,’ the 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See John J. Barnhardt et al., Use of Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions in Intellectual Property Litigation, 
74 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 683, 688 (1992).  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).  
 82. See Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 83. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 84. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (stating that “[t]he privilege 
only protects disclosure of communications” and “does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by 
those who communicated with the attorney”); Pioneer, 238 F.3d at 1376 (noting that “[t]he district court 
also suggested that offering corporate counsel to testify as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on factual matters 
might have waived the privilege and any work product protection. We do not agree.”); Motley, 71 F.3d 
at 1552 (stating that mere designation of counsel as corporate representative for deposition under Rule 
30(b)(6) does not waive attorney-client privilege). 
 85. Rodger L. Wilson & Steve C. Posner, Questions Beyond the Scope: Defending Against the Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) Sneak Attack, 26 COLO. LAW. 87, 88 (1997). 
13
Simpson: The Monster in the Closet: Declawing the Inequitable Conduct Beas
Published by Reading Room, 2009
748 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
 
 
privilege has been held to have been waived.”86 Whether this 
designation provides a safer method for attorney testimony without 
waiver remains untested. 
II.  ANALYSIS  
A.   Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver in Inequitable Conduct Cases 
1.   Choice of Law: Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Moe 
Federal Circuit law governs whether attorney-client privilege is 
implicated in an inequitable conduct case; however, once a court 
determines that the attorney-client privilege attaches, regional law 
governs whether that privilege has been waived.87 The regional courts 
have misinterpreted the Federal Circuit’s holdings in multiple 
instances and held that Federal Circuit law governs waiver in this 
instance.88 This misunderstanding may stem from the Federal 
Circuit’s lack of a “consistent conceptual framework” for choice of 
procedural law questions.89  The Federal Circuit only applies its own 
law to cases of attorney-client privilege implicating substantive issues 
of patent law; whether substantive issues of patent law are implicated 
depends largely upon the court’s level of abstraction and does not 
always reference other cases in the same jurisprudence.90 “The court 
should not create its own body of . . . law in one case and then defer 
to regional circuit . . . law in another” for cases implicating attorney-
client privilege.91  
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
 87. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 88. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382, 
391–92 (W.D. Penn. 2005); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
 89. See generally Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A 
Framework for Addressing the Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1639, 1639 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 1668–69. 
 91. Id. at 1674. 
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This misunderstanding has created interesting results in the 
regional courts. For instance, in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. 
Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., a Western District of Pennsylvania 
Court held that the question of waiver arising from reliance on 
counsel’s advice as a reason for not disclosing prior art to the PTO 
was addressed under Federal Circuit law rather than regional circuit 
waiver law.92 Similarly, in Leland Stanford Junior University v. 
Roche Medical Molecular Systems Inc., the Northern District of 
California Court held that when waiver turned on a patent applicant’s 
submission of the material to the PTO, Federal Circuit law, rather 
than regional circuit law, would govern the waiver analysis.93 This 
misinterpretation results in an interestingly circular application of the 
law: if the district courts apply Federal Circuit law, but the Federal 
Circuit applies regional circuit court law, whose law is really being 
applied? 
In Murata Manufacturing Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., a recent case from 
the Northern District of Illinois, the court did not even discuss choice 
of law; when listing applicable law for the case, the court cited cases 
from the Federal Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern 
District of California, forging a patchwork of law that a litigant could 
never anticipate before trial.94 Similarly, in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI 
Inc., the District of Delaware failed to discuss choice of law, but 
loosely applied only District of Delaware law before appearing to 
come up with the scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver out of 
thin air.95 In Leland Stanford, after a lengthy discussion highlighting 
the difficulty courts face in applying Federal Circuit precedent, a 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Martin Marietta Materials, 227 F.R.D. at 391–92. 
 93. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 
623 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 94. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
8, 2007). 
 95. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Del. 2006), aff’d by 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
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Northern District of California court determined that Federal Circuit 
law applied to waiver of attorney-client privilege.96  
Some cases indicate that it does not matter which law is applied 
because the law of the regional circuits is so similar to the Federal 
Circuit law that the “choice of law” issue is merely academic.97 
Digging deeper into the issue, the “choice of law” question is not 
merely academic because the scope of the subject matter of the 
waiver varies between the circuits—sometimes even varying within 
the circuit—and may weigh on whether an attorney should take the 
stand.98 Because of this spectrum of interpretation for the scope of the 
subject matter waived by a voluntary disclosure, many cases include 
discussions about the appropriate choice of law.99 One commentator 
even suggested that courts generally pay lip service to the standards 
articulated in In re Spalding, but then interpret the scope of the 
waiver in the same manner they had before In re Spalding.100 
Unfortunately, the choice-of-procedural-law debate for the Federal 
Circuit also surfaces in areas other than inequitable conduct.101 One 
commentator has proposed establishing a new framework for 
evaluating procedural law in the Federal Circuit.102 While a solution 
for this issue may not come immediately, this peculiar ingredient in 
the stew of attorney-client privilege waiver sets the stage for the 
unpredictability in the application of that waiver. 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Leland Stanford, 237 F.R.D. at 623 (involving communications between an attorney and the 
PTO). 
 97. See In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In any event, we 
would reach the same result applying Federal Circuit law.”). 
 98. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 99. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 100. Jonathan G. Musch, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Patent Prosecution Process in the 
Post-Spalding World, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 197–200 (2003). 
 101. See generally McEldowney, supra note 89. 
 102. Id. 
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2.  Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
 a.  First Things First: When Should Attorney Testimony 
Implicate Attorney-Client Privilege 
If a prosecuting patent attorney were to testify at trial, opposing 
counsel would attempt to elicit any type of information to show that 
the attorney had the knowledge and intent required to establish 
inequitable conduct.103 Opposing counsel would likely ask questions 
about why the attorney failed to disclose the allegedly material 
information when prosecuting the patent. Assuming the attorney does 
not admit his ineptitude or intent to deceive the PTO, the testimony 
often falls into two major scenarios.  
Imagine a scenario where the prosecuting patent attorney (A) is 
testifying under cross-examination by opposing counsel (O): 
O: Why did you fail to disclose Document Y when prosecuting 
Invention X? 
A: Because I did not think Document Y was material to the 
patentability of Invention X. 
O: Why not? 
A: Because [insert mental thoughts and impressions comparing 
the two documents]. 
A similar scenario follows: 
O: Why did you fail to disclose Document Y when prosecuting 
Invention X? 
A: I was never made aware of Document Y (so I had no duty to 
disclose it). 
Should this type of testimony implicate attorney-client privilege in 
the first place? None of the information in the attorney’s testimony 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See, e.g., Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 8, 2007). 
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explicitly mentions any communications between the attorney and the 
client. However, if a communication did exist between the client and 
attorney—assuming arguendo that the communication occurred 
between privileged persons, in confidence, and for the purpose of 
providing legal assistance—then this type of testimony would 
implicate attorney-client privilege.  
This type of testimony by the attorney, disavowing any previous 
knowledge of the information or providing the attorney’s subjective 
reasoning for failing to disclose the information, presents two 
problems. On its face, it appears very self-serving; this testimony, 
while opening the door to privilege waiver, likely has limited utility 
in the courtroom. Of greater concern to the court is the verifiability of 
those statements, an inquiry concerning waiver.104  
Further, from a public policy viewpoint, attorney-client privilege is 
designed to encourage “full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”105 
Extending the privilege to encompass this type of information—such 
as an attorney’s mental impressions,106 thoughts, and feelings when 
determining prior art materiality—does not further this policy on its 
face. 
This point is of critical importance. If a court finds that attorney-
client privilege is not even implicated, then it follows that the court 
should not find waiver of that privilege. If the court cannot find 
waiver of the privilege, then the court should not order the client to 
produce privileged documents on the same “subject matter.” The 
court thus never inquires into the scope of the waiver. That inquiry, 
however, causes the unpredictable disclosure results in most cases.107 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 105. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 106. When discussing the attorney’s mental impressions, questions of work-product immunity arise—
a sibling issue weaving its way into the discussion in many cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). 
Although work-product is similar to attorney-client privilege waiver, this Note does not address work-
product. 
 107. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
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 b.   To Waive or Not to Waive: That Is the Question 
When testifying to the substance of privileged communications, a 
party waives attorney-client privilege.108 In GFI, Inc. v. Franklin 
Corp. an attorney testified about his state of mind, knowledge of 
prior art, and communication with the patentee, and on cross 
examination, he discussed his conversations with the inventor 
regarding the duty of disclosure in a previous trial.109 Similarly, in the 
District of Delaware, a patent practitioner testified in deposition 
about communications with inventors regarding the materiality of a 
prior art reference in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., and the court found 
waiver of attorney-client privilege to all communications between the 
inventors and practitioner.110 In those cases, the court found express 
attorney-client privilege waiver because the attorney actually testified 
about the substance of privileged communications, constituting a 
voluntary privilege waiver.111 
Courts often look at fairness when determining whether a waiver 
of attorney-client privilege has occurred.112 This fairness analysis can 
lead to incongruous results, because fairness, like beauty, can be in 
the eyes of the beholder. From the perspective of the party claiming 
inequitable conduct, it would be unfair for the defending attorney to 
offer unverifiable, self-serving testimony without pointing to 
anything to substantiate the claims. From the perspective of the party 
defending the claim of inequitable conduct, it would be unfair to 
allow unchecked claims of inequitable conduct with costly and 
invasive discovery while handcuffing the prosecuting patent attorney 
with an uncertain waiver issue. Which perspective dominates? 
The fairness inquiry weighs heavily in the courts’ analysis. A court 
recently found that forcing a party to choose between defending itself 
(and waiving privilege) and opting not to testify (to preserve 
                                                                                                                 
 108. E.g., GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (D. Del. 2006) aff’d by 543 F.3d 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 111. See Praxair, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 112. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b. 
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privilege) was an intolerable choice, analogous to proposing that one 
constitutional right should be given up to assert another:  
If accepted, a defendant charged with inequitable conduct would 
find itself between Scylla and Charybdis: it would either have to 
waive its attorney client privilege in order to defend itself or 
concede liability in order to preserve the privilege, which would 
become valueless. In a constitutional context, the Supreme Court 
has said that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be forced to 
choose between asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege at the 
price of relinquishing his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court found it intolerable that one constitutional right should 
have to be surrendered in order to assert another. While the 
“benefit” to be given up—the attorney-client privilege—is not a 
constitutional right, it is one that lies at the heart of our adversary 
system.113  
In General Electric Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., a District of 
Delaware case, counsel testified about his intent (or lack of intent) to 
defraud the PTO.114 The court found defendants could refute such 
testimony only by examining the communications because “[i]n light 
of [plaintiff]’s affirmative representations regarding [the attorneys’] 
state of mind, and in light of the record reflecting contemporaneous 
communications between [the attorneys], fairness requires that 
defendants be allowed to uncover the foundations for [plaintiff]’s 
assertions.”115 In this case, the prosecuting patent attorney offered 
testimony denying any recollection of the prior art at issue, and stated 
that even if he had remembered it, he would have considered it 
irrelevant.116 The court found partial privilege waiver because a party 
testifying about its state of mind at the time of alleged privileged 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
8, 2007) (citations omitted). 
 114. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678–80 (D. Del. 1990). 
 115. Id. at 1679–80. 
 116. Id. at 1679. 
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communications must allow the opposition to discover the privileged 
communications or point to non-privileged communications 
instead.117  
Similarly, in Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Development 
Corp., the Northern District of California found partial waiver of 
attorney-client privilege when the prosecuting patent attorney 
testified that he disclosed all material prior art he was aware of to the 
PTO.118 There, the court found it would be unfair to deny opposing 
counsel the opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect 
to the same subject matter, and found the attorney’s statements 
amounted to more than a mere denial of intent.119 The Western 
District of Pennsylvania also  found waiver of attorney client 
privilege because the plaintiff’s attorney testified about his 
understanding of his duty to disclose, materiality of prior art, and the 
role attorney-client communications played in the decision not to 
disclose.120 In those three cases, the courts found waiver of attorney-
client privilege out of fairness to the party alleging inequitable 
conduct, finding it unfair to allow the prosecuting patent attorney to 
testify at length without allowing the opposing party to view the 
information tending to support or refute his statements. 
Compare those cases with Murata Manufacturing. Co. v. Bel Fuse, 
Inc., where, after Murata claimed the prior art was “so immaterial to 
the patentability of the patent-in-suit that the inventors and Murata’s 
attorneys never even considered disclosing it” in depositions and 
interrogatories, the court found no waiver occurred.121 In Murata, the 
court found that the non-privileged, publicly-available 
communications between the PTO Examiner and Murata’s attorneys 
provided sufficient evidence to opposing counsel to avoid waiver.122 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 1679–80. 
 118. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 655–56 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 119. Id. at 653–54. 
 120. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382, 397 (W.D. 
Penn. 2005). 
 121. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 
2007). 
 122. Id. 
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With such extremely similar facts, why do those two cases have such 
opposite results after applying the same standards of fairness? In 
Murata, the attorney was testifying as a 30(b)(6) fact witness; 
whether this designation resolves those seemingly incongruous 
results remains unclear.123 
Even absent designation as a 30(b)(6) witness, some courts still 
find no waiver occurs from attorney testimony defending a charge of 
inequitable conduct. For instance, in Laser Industries Ltd. v. Reliant 
Technologies, Inc., a Northern District of California court found no 
waiver when a prosecuting patent attorney made “a lengthy 
declaration” about his knowledge of prior art and denied any fraud or 
inequitable conduct.124 In the Southern District of Texas, in Derrick 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Southwestern Wire Cloth, Inc., no waiver of 
attorney-client privilege was found after an attorney denied recalling 
any discussion of prior art with the patentee during the deposition.125 
The common thread in Murata, Laser, and Derrick is the courts’ 
perspective on fairness; in each case, the courts focused on the 
unfairness of forcing a party to choose between defending itself and 
waiving privilege, or pulling its punches to avoid waiver.126 
One argument supporting waiver in those cases involves a less 
invasive discovery method, like disclosure subject to in camera 
review;127 while less invasive, this is still extremely costly and 
burdensome on the producing party. Some may even argue that no 
true harm occurs unless the patent practitioner lied when testifying, 
since documents ordered for production ought to be subject to review 
in camera and disclosed only if contradictory.128 Courts may consider 
whether a party alleging inequitable conduct seeks an in camera 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 124. Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Tech., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 125. Derrick Mfg. Corp. v. Sw. Wire Cloth, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
 126. See generally Murata, 2007 WL 781252 at *1; Derrick, 934 F. Supp. at 817; Laser, 167 F.R.D. 
at 446. 
 127. An in camera review takes place either in the judge’s chambers or in the courtroom with “all 
spectators excluded.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (8th ed. 2004). 
 128. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 n.4 (D. 
Del. 1990). 
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review or outright disclosure.129 The fairness to the parties, as well as 
the burden and cost associated with the discovery, support a narrow 
construction of attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable 
conduct cases.  
Another fairness issue raised by courts involves improper use of 
inequitable conduct allegations as a routine litigation tactic.130 
Unfortunately, raising the specter of inequitable conduct in a patent 
infringement suit is often nothing more than a litigation tactic aimed 
to either gain broad discovery or force the adversary to pull its 
punches.131 Patent infringement suits may be filed as “an excuse to 
determine everything the opponent is pursuing as far as obtaining 
patents”132 and “[a]ny willingness by a court to force production of 
technical information will only further this improper and unethical 
practice . . . .”133 For particularly abusive cases, Rule 11 sanctions—
allowing sanctions for parties who knowingly file papers or 
misrepresentations with the court—are available but rarely used.134 
“Alleged infringers do risk Rule 11 sanctions for a completely false 
charge of inequitable conduct, but this hardly constitutes an 
appropriate risk to balance the drawbacks to patent owners.”135 One 
commentator suggests that providing for strict liability and costs to 
the losing party, rather than relying on Rule 11 sanctions, would be a 
more appropriate and fair process.136  
Essentially, if an attorney testifies against a charge of inequitable 
conduct, whether a court finds attorney-client privilege waiver 
depends largely upon where the suit is brought and the particular 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 234 F.R.D. 667, 671 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 130. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 
 131. See Dolak, supra note 33, at 719 (“Its popularity as a litigation issue—some might say ‘tactic’—
should come as no surprise, given the advantages and potential dividends enjoyed by infringement 
defendants who raise inequitable conduct challenges.”).  
 132. Rodgers, supra note 47, at 749; accord id. at 749 n.148 (“Plain logic dictates that a plaintiff is far 
more likely to bring an infringement suit if it knows, win or lose, it has a good chance of discovering 
valuable technical information from a competitor.”). 
 133. Id. at 749 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing sanctions for abusive discovery practices)). 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Glenn E. Von Tersch, Note, Curing the Inequitable Conduct Plague 
in Patent Litigation, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 422 (1998). 
 135. Von Tersch, supra note 134, at 426–27. 
 136. Id. at 440–41. 
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biases and policy preferences of that court. Allowing this type of 
inconsistent application of the attorney-client privilege waiver defeats 
the purpose of the privilege, placing a patentee at an intolerably high 
risk of loss if choosing to have an attorney testify at trial. 
 c.  The Scope of the Waiver: The Devil Is in the Details 
In general, once a court finds waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege, the waiver extends to all communications between the 
attorney and the client on the same subject matter.137 “The underlying 
rationale is one of fairness: ‘A party cannot disclose only those facts 
beneficial to its case and refuse to disclose, on the grounds of 
privilege, related facts adverse to its position.’”138 Just as the waiver 
of attorney-client privilege is inconsistently applied, the scope of that 
waiver is also uncertain.  
Some courts find the scope of the waiver very broad. For instance, 
in one Federal Circuit case, an attorney testified, inter alia, about his 
state of mind, knowledge of prior art, and communications with the 
patentee.139 The court found a broad waiver of privilege, forcing the 
production of otherwise privileged information;140 this information 
included discussions of prior art before the PTO interview that were 
questioned in the case. Although the court order was very broad, it 
was in camera rather than outright disclosure; the information was 
disclosed because it directly contradicted the testimony given by the 
attorney.141 Similarly, a Northern District of California court ruled 
that by submitting declarations to the PTO to support a petition to 
correct inventorship in patent, and in those declarations the applicant 
disclosed privileged communications with its prosecution patent 
counsel, the patentee had waived attorney-client privilege and any 
                                                                                                                 
 137. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 138. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1994); accord 
FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 139. GFI, 265 F.3d at 1273.  
 140. Id.  
 141. See generally id. 
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work-product immunity; that subject matter waiver extended to the 
entire subject of inventorship.142 
The Ninth Circuit construes subject matter more narrowly, 
however,143 “holding that disclosure of information resulting in the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege constitutes a waiver ‘only as to 
communications about the matter actually disclosed.’”144 Even 
further down the spectrum, the Second Circuit has held that 
disclosing privileged communications does not waive the privilege 
“beyond those matters actually revealed.”145 In each of those cases, 
and in each circuit, the scope of the waiver follows similar fairness 
trends as the waiver issue. Courts that frequently find waiver based 
on fairness often construe the scope of that waiver broadly, whereas 
courts that are more hesitant to find waiver construe the scope of the 
waiver narrowly.146 Again, the ideological split breeds confusion and 
the very type of unpredictability courts should seek to avoid. 
B.  30(b)(6) Witnesses 
Precious few cases explore the impact of attorney testimony as a 
30(b)(6) witness in defense of inequitable conduct on attorney-client 
privilege waiver. One recent case supports testimony on deposition as 
a 30(b)(6) fact witness without privilege waiver.147 In this Northern 
District of Illinois case, Murata sued Bel Fuse for infringement; Bel 
Fuse asserted, among other things, inequitable conduct, alleging 
Murata’s attorneys intentionally withheld one highly material 
patent.148 In response to the inequitable conduct charge, Murata 
designated a Murata patent attorney as a 30(b)(6) witness, and in 
those depositions (and others), Murata claimed that the patent was 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 
625 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 143. Id. at 622–23 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 144. Id. (citing Chevron, 974 F.2d at 1162). 
 145. In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 146. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 147. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
8, 2007). 
 148. Id. at *1. 
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immaterial.149 In fact, Murata claimed it was “so immaterial to the 
patentability of the patent-in-suit that the inventors and Murata’s 
attorneys never even considered disclosing it.”150 Bel Fuse then 
sought disclosure of documents related to this issue, to which Murata 
claimed attorney-client privilege.151 Bel Fuse argued both express 
waiver (for admitting the existence of privileged communications) 
and implied waiver (for putting its state of mind as to key elements of 
the inequitable conduct at issue) by designating the attorney as a fact 
witness, but the court held no waiver and denied Bel Fuse’s motion to 
compel.152 The court found no express waiver because Murata’s 
witness admitted the existence of privileged communications, but did 
not disclose the contents of such communications.153 The court found 
no implied waiver.154 This is an interesting result in light of our 
earlier hypothetical: 
Bel Fuse: Why didn’t you disclose the patent X when 
prosecuting the patent Y? 
Murata: Because the patent X was so immaterial to the 
patentability of the patent Y that we never even considered 
disclosing it. 
Bel Fuse: Why not? 
Murata: Because of [“comparisons between the two devices, and 
a history of prior art references made in prosecution of patents 
for related types of devices”].155 
This is almost directly opposite from the outcome in General 
Electric where the court found the attorney-client privilege waived 
when state of mind was at issue and the only way to refute the 
attorney’s assertions was by examining otherwise protected 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at *1, 8. 
 153. Murata, 2007 WL 781252, at *1, 8. 
 154. Id. at *8. 
 155. Id. at *6. 
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communications.156 Rather, in Murata, the court stated that “[i]t is the 
manner of proof involved that determines whether there has been a 
waiver”; the court found “nothing to suggest that resolution of this 
issue will require examination of confidential communications.”157  
If not looking to confidential materials, what materials can support 
or refute those allegations? According to the Murata court, most of 
those responses can be tested by referring to non-privileged 
information in the “public record of the patent prosecution.”158 The 
court highlighted the absurdity of a holding to the contrary:  
Any defendant in any patent infringement case could destroy its 
opponent’s attorney-client privilege by leveling the rather common 
charge of inequitable conduct before the patent office. The plaintiff 
denies the charge, thereby placing its state of mind at issue and voila, 
the defendant has access to the plaintiff’s privileged communications 
with its counsel. It would happen in every case.159 
In 2001, the Federal Circuit discussed attorney-client privilege 
waiver in conjunction with Rule 30(b)(6), but the case did not involve 
inequitable conduct.160 In Pioneer, the Federal Circuit stated: 
The district court also suggested that offering corporate counsel 
to testify as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on factual matters might 
have waived the privilege and any work product protection. We 
do not agree. . . . Counsel is often a fact witness with respect to 
various events, and may testify on deposition by the opposing 
party as to such matters without waiver. A different result would 
obtain, of course, if counsel were offered to testify as to 
privileged or protected matters and might obtain if counsel were 
offered as a fact witness at trial by his client.161  
                                                                                                                 
 156. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679–80 (D. Del. 1990).  
 157. Murata, 2007 WL 781252 at * 6. 
 158. Id. at *7. 
 159. Id. at *8. 
 160. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). Compare id. (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (“stating that mere designation of counsel as corporate representative for deposition pursuant 
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A different result may occur in those two situations because of the 
way the privilege was used. In a 30(b)(6) scenario, the patentee uses 
the privilege as a shield, preventing the opponent from probing into 
privileged matters during discovery. When an attorney is voluntarily 
called as a witness at trial, however, the attorney is using the 
privilege as a sword to make assertions to benefit the patentee while 
preventing the opponent from accessing information it may need to 
refute the patentee’s assertions. This distinction, though untested, 
may tilt the fairness analysis toward the patentee, and may provide 
more favorable results. 
III.   PROPOSALS 
A.   Legislative Proposals—The New IDS Rules: Be Afraid. Be Very 
Afraid.  
The current major changes in patent law—from their 
congressional, judicial, and PTO origins—should not be allowed to 
ripple into other areas of patent law and cause significant imbalances 
at trial.162 The proposed PTO rules are intended to increase efficiency 
in the patent application process, not hamstring patent practitioners at 
trial, but that may be exactly what those rules may do. 
Those proposed rules would put patent practitioners between a 
rock and a hard place. The attorney can limit the list to twenty items, 
running the risk of a charge of inequitable conduct if a court deems 
any of the items left off of the list to be an intentional, material 
omission.163 Or, perhaps even worse, the attorney can prepare an 
                                                                                                                 
to [Rule] 30(b)(6) does not waive attorney-client privilege”)) with Leybold-Heraeus Tech., Inc. v. 
Midwest Instrument Co., 118 F.R.D. 609, 609–10 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that “where patentee 
named two of its attorneys as witnesses, patentee waived attorney-client privilege with regard to 
documents which attorneys participated in, either as recipient of communication or communicator as to 
prior art or as to good-faith belief and validity of patents in question and good faith in maintaining 
lawsuits”). 
 162. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 163. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (C.D. Cal.. 2007) 
(stating a withheld document may lead to a finding of inequitable conduct if the court determines the 
omission was intentional and material); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007). 
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explanation of the relevance of any references in excess of twenty, 
whereby those explanations enter the prosecution record and will 
make for easy targets during litigation.164  
If an attorney chooses the latter option and prepares explanations 
of the relevance of documents in excess of twenty submitted in an 
information disclosure statement, litigation over inequitable conduct 
may center even more closely on the attorney’s discretion and 
subjective opinions of materiality, and it may be even more important 
for the attorney to actually get on the stand and testify, lest opposing 
counsel paint a nasty picture of intentional deceit and concealment.165 
Unleashing the litigation teams onto practitioners, while effectively 
handcuffing practitioners with an unpredictable waiver issue, could 
cause a significant imbalance in trial; timely resolution of this issue is 
needed. The PTO should reconsider implementation of its proposed 
rules because of these unanticipated collateral effects.166 
B.   Judicial Proposals: A New Standard to Even the Playing Field 
Because of the unintended consequences rippling through patent 
law from other areas, the Federal Circuit needs to take a new look at 
the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege in the context of 
inequitable conduct.167 The Federal Circuit has recently shown some 
willingness to revisit attorney-client privilege waiver, but in the 
context of asserting an “advice of counsel” defense.168 It should now 
continue this trend by clearly articulating a narrow scope of the 
subject matter waived by allowing an attorney to testify in defense of 
a charge of inequitable conduct, and force courts to take those 
documents into in camera review rather than allow immediate 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Nipper, supra note 17; see also Auth, supra note 16, at 1. 
 165. Litigators salivate at the prospect of litigating under those new rules, some even calling them a 
“litigator’s dream.” Nipper, supra note 17 (“Joy! A litigator’s dream! Think of all the ‘inequitable 
conduct’ and ‘fraud’ arguments that can be triggered by requiring the Applicant to comment on the prior 
art.”). 
 166. See Auth, supra note 16, at 1; Nipper, supra note 17. 
 167. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 168. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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disclosure to the opposing counsel.169 This would maintain the 
sanctity of the attorney-client privilege,170 would curb the abuses of 
using inequitable conduct as a mere litigation tactic to uncover 
research and development of patentees, and may stop the wildfire of 
inequitable conduct before it gets out of hand.171 Thus, in the future, 
when courts are faced with the illusive balancing test of fairness, the 
slight presumption would tilt toward the patentee, allowing for more 
consistent application of the fairness doctrine across the United 
States. 
C.   Practical Considerations During Litigation: Recommendations 
in the Meantime 
Given the tremendous stakes of having the attorney testify—the 
scope of this waiver could be very broad, invasive, and expensive—
and the lack of a bright line rule for determining the “subject matter” 
of the waiver,172 having the attorney testify in defense of inequitable 
conduct is extremely risky. Alternatives to minimize the risks 
associated with attorney testimony include attempting to resolve the 
scope of the waiver in advance, either by agreement with the other 
party173 or by a motion to determine the scope of the waiver.174 Those 
alternatives once failed to provide completely safe options—
sometimes the scope of the waiver was reopened during trial by an 
opposing party, after the information in question had already been 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 170. See generally Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 8, 2007) (insinuating that the current rules destroy the heart and soul of attorney-client 
privilege). 
 171. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 172. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“There is no bright 
line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the 
circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of 
permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.”). 
 173. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1994); FED. R. 
EVID. 502(e).  
 174. See, e.g., Dey, L.P. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 567, 572 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Louis Vuitton 
Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04-Civ.-5316-(RMB)-(MHD) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87096, at 
*16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2006). 
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disclosed.175 However, under Rule 16(b)(5), courts have the 
discretion to enter orders encompassing “any agreements the parties 
reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection” after 
production and now may be more inclined to address privilege 
disputes early in litigation.176 This theme has been further codified in 
Rule 502, which now binds parties to their pre-trial agreements on 
waiver and limits waiver in one proceeding to only that 
proceeding.177 Any movement toward more pretrial determinations of 
the scope of the waiver, whether by stipulation or by court order, 
would allow clients to enter into the privilege waiver arena with an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of such waiver, 
and could restore the predictability missing in the current system. 
Aside from stipulating ahead of time to the scope of the waiver, 
perhaps the safest avenue for a patentee may be to try to designate the 
patent prosecuting attorney as a 30(b)(6) fact witness. This may tip 
the presumptions of fairness toward the patentee, allowing for a 
narrower construction of attorney-client privilege waiver.178 
Although the case law suggests this possibility may exist, this 
relatively untested avenue remains risky, especially for the high 
stakes in litigation.179 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney-client privilege waiver in the context of inequitable 
conduct is currently quite chaotic.180 Many district courts are unsure 
of which law to apply; even when the courts can get the right choice 
of law for attorney-client privilege in inequitable conduct cases, the 
scope of the waiver is construed so inconsistently as to become 
nonsensical and abusive when viewed as a whole.181 Although it may 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87096. 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
 177. FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 178. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 181. See discussion supra Part II. 
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be possible to have an attorney testify as a 30(b)(6) fact witness, this 
does not fully alleviate the problem.182 Now, with patent law in flux 
and the new information disclosure statement rules looming on the 
horizon, the perfect storm exists for litigation in inequitable conduct 
cases to run amuck.183  
The desperate need in this situation is for consistency. To get the 
district courts on the same page, the Federal Circuit should articulate 
a clear standard in favor of a narrow construction of attorney-client 
privilege waiver in inequitable conduct cases.184 A narrow 
construction would be in the interests of fairness, prevent abuses to 
the system in litigation, and level the playing field given the new 
information disclosure statement rules.185 Maybe then the patent 
practitioners could get a good night’s sleep again. 
 
Alexis N. Simpson 
 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. 
 183. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 184. See discussion supra Part III. 
 185. Id. 
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